



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

August 14, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit in processing your request.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. As a result of these checks, we were able to locate the enclosed records pertaining to Israel Intelligence Services, ZF400054W.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the information no longer warrants security classification protection and is partially releasable to you. Fees for processing this request are waived.

Since the release of the information sanitized from these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, it is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

In addition, since the release of the information in the records would reveal the identity of confidential sources, it is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.


We have been informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that their review disclosed information that is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the FOIA. To aid you in identifying the FBI exempted information; we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the FBI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20530-0001 within 60 days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or Information Appeal". Please cite FBI FOI/PA #428212 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We are continuing to review records regarding other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case #824F-01.

Sincerely,



Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF400054

As of 8 MAR. 79 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E. Ward 8 MAR. 79
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOIS E. WARD
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
DATE FEB 28 90
REVIEWER K. J. ARGAN

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER Wms

DATE 8-19-92

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER ffh DATE 13 Nov 91

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

1

TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL TO IRR*

*NOTE: This form is not required when material is forwarded to IRR with DA Form 2784-R, but may be used as a supplement to DA Form 2784-R to provide additional instructions.

1. TO:
☒ Records Processing Division
☐ Special Records Division
☐ Supplemental Review Division

2. FROM:
SOD
IASO-SA

3. DATE 10 JUL 78

4. PERSONAL/IMPERSONAL SUBJECT (Establish dossier or add material to existing dossier)

a. SUBJECT: *Israeli Intelligence Service ZF400054*

b. DOB:

d. SSN:

c. POB:

e. Alias/Nee

5. PERSONAL/IMPERSONAL INDEX CROSS-REFERENCES (Continue on plain bond paper if needed)

Name/Impersonal Title

DOB

POB

SSN

Alias/Nee

(b)(6)

6. FORWARD DOSSIER TO:

☒ Files

☐ Account Number: *ZF400054*

7. AR 380-13 (Check one or both)

☒ Attached material meets retention criteria of AR 380-13

☐ DA Form 4312-R (Retention Control Sheet) is attached

8. DISPOSITION OF CASE (If not reflected on DA Form 2784-R)

Referred to USAREUR

9. REQUEST FOR CONTROL (For controlled dossier material only; enter data required by para 3-4, AR 381-45)

10. IRR USE ONLY

☐ AR 380-13

☐ AR 381-45

Dossier No: *ZF40 00 54*

Aging Criteria: _____

Investigative Records Repository (IRR)

Reviewed for retention criteria UP AR380-13

Reviewer: *Jane Crum* Date: *13 Nov 78*

02

8DEC77/MRHARJES/2401/id

DM
2/12/77

IAINTA-SO-SA

SUBJECT: Possible Israeli Espionage Activity - West Berlin

DEC 05 1977

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
US Army Europe and Seventh Army
ATTN: ARAGB-CI(80)
APO New York 09403

1. Reference NSA letter, dated 23 November 1977, subject as above.
2. The inclosed correspondence is forwarded as a matter pertaining to your command and any action deemed appropriate. Request SOD be kept apprised of any significant information developed by your office regarding this matter.

1 Incl *(u)*
as (CONF)

DONALD B. GRIMES
Colonel, MI
Commanding

DM

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when
separated from classified inclosure.

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page (s) 4-6

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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
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Page(s)

7-44

INTEREST CODING

INTEL
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reply, Please Refer to

The No.

4856 865

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 20, 2004

65 05

96-718) b1 013057

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1
per [redacted]

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8/14/98
CLASSIFIED BY 39063 [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
124D

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Army

"USACRF FILE COPY"

Link

WFOI

(S) b1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On September 28, 1964, Mr. Clement A. Palamara, Chief, Research Branch, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Government, Maryland, advised he could find no record of requests for visits of the subject to the AEC installations. He did not know of any complaints received from the contractors concerning the subject or his activities.

POOR QUALITY ORIGINAL-

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~~SECRET~~

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Page(s) 47-51

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ON MAY 6 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO

AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Israel Act.

013057

ACSI-SC
ACSI

Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)
DSMCI

10 JAN 1961
Lt McJunkin/slc/72434

(C)

1. (U) (C) Following summarized information (detailed report in Incl 1) is submitted in answer to ACSI's written query reference a UPI news item appearing in The Press Summary dated 28 December 1960, as shown in Incl 2.

2. (U) (C) The current unsettled political situation in Israel is the outgrowth of a politically embarrassing internal struggle in Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party. Ben-Gurion and his adherents are aligned against Pinhas Lavon, member of the Mapai and Secretary General of the Histadrut, Israel's powerful labor federation. Lavon has strong support from one faction of the Mapai members of the Cabinet. Foreign Minister Golda Meir, a long-time supporter of Ben-Gurion, has criticized both sides in the controversy for their excessive attacks, which weaken the Mapai Party. In protest at the notably strong accusations of Ben-Gurion against Lavon, Meir has threatened to resign from the Cabinet, but it now appears that she will remain in office. The crux of the controversy, at least on the surface, apparently centers on an incident termed the "Lavon affair". This alludes to an ill-fated Israeli intelligence operation conducted in 1954 while Lavon was Minister of Defense in Prime Minister Sharett's Cabinet. The most widespread speculation alleges that the incident involved an abortive espionage attempt in Egypt which resulted in the hanging of two Egyptian Jews and imprisonment of others. In early 1955 an inquiry committee appointed by Lavon to determine responsibility for the "mishap" unexpectedly returned the finding that Lavon himself was ultimately responsible. Lavon resigned as Minister of Defense in February 1955, but watched for an opportunity to exonerate himself. This opportunity came in the Summer of 1960 when one of the Army officers who had presented testimony to the 1955 committee was arrested and tried on criminal charges, and opened his credibility to question. Public attention centered on the matter forced Ben-Gurion to reluctantly re-open the "Lavon affair". Subsequently, a seven-man Ministerial Committee appointed by the Knesset (Parliament) fully exonerated Lavon in a report formally presented to the Cabinet on 25 December 1960.

3. (U) (C) Ben-Gurion showed increasing personal bitterness toward Lavon as the 1960 inquiry proceeded, and upon receiving the Ministerial Committee report, expressed extreme displeasure at the findings which favored Lavon. Ben-Gurion, after submission of the report, began talking of resigning, or at least taking leave, unless he received satisfaction in the Lavon matter.

4. (U) (C) There are still unexplained facets surrounding the furor over this closely guarded Israeli affair. The indicated facts do not fully explain Ben-Gurion's increasingly heated attitude toward Lavon in this controversy. Further, it has not been indicated why Ben-Gurion was so reluctant to re-open the investigation until the above mentioned Army officer's criminal trial in the Summer of 1960 forced his hand. It is possible that Ben-Gurion's attitude may

w/ mtr & memo for ACSI

pac Suspense

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RECORD SECTION C
Counterintelligence

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10 JAN 1961

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

be motivated by a desire to shield, by vigorously attacking Lavon, one or more of his own political proteges. Among these is Shimon Peres, who was Lavon's Director General in the Ministry of Defense in 1954-1955 and who is presently Deputy Minister of Defense to Ben-Gurion. Damaging revelations concerning the involvement in the "security mishap" of Peres, or other leading Ben-Gurion adherents, would prove even more serious than the controversy thus far, which has already weakened the Mapai. A further consideration is the possibility of Ben-Gurion's actual involvement himself in the 1954-1955 actions of certain defense officials or intelligence officials who have come to be known as "Ben-Gurion's young men". If this should be the case, however, there is further contradiction in the fact that Ben-Gurion, initially so reluctant to open the matter, now apparently is unwilling to close it until he has his way, regardless of the accompanying publicity.

(Sgd) C. F. Leonard, Jr.

2 Incl

1. Memo for ACSI, subj:
Current Israeli
Political Feud and
1954 Security Case (U)

C. F. LEONARD, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Security, Mapping
and Combat Intelligence

2. UPI News Item, dtd 23 Dec 60 - 7069 11/5

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ON MAY 6 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO

AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 January 1961)

(u)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

CURRENT: Inst DF and Memo in response to CI Br requirement per telecon Col Weigand/Maj Roseto, 30 Dec 60, followed by DD Form 278, #P609363, dtd 30 Dec 60 with original suspense date 30 Dec 60, changed to 4 Jan 61 per telecon Maj Roseto/Mr M. Kelly, 3 Jan 61. Action outlines the development of the current political controversy within Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Mapai party, and traces the origins of the controversy back to the 1954-1955 security case referred to as the "Lavon Affair".

BACKGROUND: CI Br requirement predicated on handwritten note by Gen Willems on Press Summary dtd 28 Dec 60, with reference to UPI report that "Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion has decided to take a long leave and Foreign Minister Golda Meir plans to resign as the result of a disagreement over a security case." Gen Willems' note, directed to DSMCI, queried "What is this case that has caused such a furor in Israel?"

STATUS: Completed.

RATIONALE: Fulfills CI Br requirement to furnish information to ACSI.

DELAY: None.

RECORDS SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: For information with Mr George W. Miller, Israel Desk, MEAF, Western Division by Lt McJunkin on 3 Jan 61. MEAF concurs also in forwarding this info in this manner to the ACSI.

Action Officer Time: 11 hr
Typist Time: 5 hr

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ON MAY 6 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO

AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Action Officer	<i>Paul B. McJunkin</i>
Ch, CIAS	<i>Sgt Roseto, May Jr</i>
Chief, CI Br	<i>[Signature]</i>
Ch, Sec Div	<i>C. O. Bacter</i>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IPAC Suspense

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

6 January 1961

SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

1. (U) The current unsettled political situation in Israel is the outgrowth of a politically embarrassing internal struggle in Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party. Ben-Gurion and his adherents are aligned against Pinhas Lavon, member of the Mapai and Secretary General of the Histadrut, Israel's powerful labor federation. Lavon has strong support from one faction of the Mapai members of the Cabinet. Foreign Minister Golda Meir, a long-time supporter of Ben-Gurion, has criticized both sides in the controversy for their excessive attacks, which weaken the Mapai Party. In protest at the notably strong accusations of Ben-Gurion against Lavon, Meir has threatened to resign from the Cabinet, but it now appears that she will remain in office. The crux of the controversy, at least on the surface, apparently centers on whether information pertaining to a certain intelligence operation of the Defense establishment should be kept secret, as Ben-Gurion desires, or made public, as Lavon desires, in order to exonerate his name.

2. (U) Current press references to a "security case" in connection with this disagreement within the Israeli Government allude to the matter known also as the "Lavon affair", dating back to 1954-1955. The issue was reluctantly revived in public by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in September 1960; as described below in its proper sequence.

3. (U) To recapitulate, Lavon served as Minister of Defense in the Sharett Cabinet in 1954-1955 during Ben-Gurion's voluntary retirement from the Prime Ministership. The facts concerning the "Lavon affair" have never been officially divulged, and the entire matter has been subject to severe censorship. It appears, however, that the beginning of this affair may be traced back to an alleged apprehension of Israeli-sponsored intelligence agents in Egypt in 1954, and their subsequent trial and execution. The operation appears to have been ineptly prepared and executed, so that the question arose as to where responsibility rested for an action which was not only embarrassing for Israel but may have adversely affected her security. (US Embassy, Tel Aviv efforts in confidential conversations to ascertain the exact nature of the "security mishap" have been unsuccessful, partly because of security consciousness on the part of Israelis, but largely, it is believed, because very few people knew what the incident was. In addition to the most widespread allegation, mentioned above, that the incident involved an abortive espionage attempt in Egypt which resulted in the hanging of two Egyptian Jews and the imprisonment of others, other speculation suggests: a) A secret operation against a major friendly power, probably the United States; b) The incident of the Bat Galim, a ship purchased by Israel for a test of Suez Canal passage which failed in that passage under somewhat mysterious circumstances; and c) An abortive espionage attempt in Syria, as a result of which a young Israeli committed suicide, allegedly to avoid disclosing secret information under torture).

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ON MAR 6 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO21
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10 Jan 61

ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

political proteges. Among these is Shimon Peres, who was Lavon's Director General in the Ministry of Defense in 1954-1955 and who is presently Deputy Minister of Defense to Ben-Gurion. Damaging revelations concerning the involvement in the "security mishap" of Peres, or other leading Ben-Gurion adherents, would prove even more serious than the controversy thus far, which has already weakened the Mapai. A further consideration is the possibility of Ben-Gurion's actual involvement himself in the 1954-1955 actions of certain defense officials or intelligence officials who have come to be known as "Ben-Gurion's young men". If this should be the case, however, there is further contradiction in the fact that Ben-Gurion, initially so reluctant to open the matter, now apparently is unwilling to close it until he has his way, regardless of the accompanying publicity.

2 Incl.

1. Memo for ACSI, subj:
Current Israeli
Political Feud and (U)
1954 Security Case (C)
2. UPI News Item, dtd 28 Dec 60

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ON MAY 6 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACSI

4 January 1961

SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

1. The current unsettled political situation in Israel is the outgrowth of a politically embarrassing internal struggle in Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Mapai Party. Ben-Gurion and his adherents are aligned against Pinhas Lavon, member of the Mapai and Secretary General of the Histadrut, Israel's powerful labor federation. Lavon has strong support from one faction of the Mapai members of the Cabinet. The crux of the controversy, at least on the surface, apparently centers on whether information pertaining to a certain intelligence operation of the Defense establishment should be kept secret, as Ben-Gurion desires, or made public, as Lavon desires, in order to exonerate his name.

2. Current press references to a "security case" in connection with this disagreement within the Israeli Government allude to the matter known also as the "Lavon affair", dating back to 1954-1955. The issue was reluctantly revived in public by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in September 1960, as described below in its proper sequence.

3. To recapitulate, Lavon served as Minister of Defense in the Sharett Cabinet in 1954-1955 during Ben-Gurion's voluntary retirement from the Prime Ministership. The facts concerning the "Lavon affair" have never been officially divulged, and the entire matter has been subject to severe censorship. It appears, however, that the beginning of this affair may be traced back to an alleged apprehension of Israeli-sponsored intelligence agents in Egypt in 1954, and their subsequent trial and execution. The operation appears to have been ineptly prepared and executed, so that the question arose as to where responsibility rested for an action which was not only embarrassing for Israel but may have adversely affected her security. (US Embassy, Tel Aviv efforts in confidential conversations to ascertain the exact nature of the "security mishap" have been unsuccessful, partly because of security consciousness on the part of Israelis, but largely, it is believed, because very few people knew what the incident was. In addition to the most widespread allegation, mentioned above, that the incident involved an abortive espionage attempt in Egypt which resulted in the hanging of two Egyptian Jews and the imprisonment of others, other speculation suggests: a) A secret operation against a major friendly power, probably the United States; b) The incident of the Bat Galim, a ship purchased by Israel for a test of Suez Canal passage which failed in that passage under somewhat mysterious circumstances; and c) An abortive espionage attempt in Syria, as a result of which a young Israeli committed suicide, allegedly to avoid disclosing secret information under torture).

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BY CDR USASISCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.10

953.4
Israel

10 Jan 61

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SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

4. (U) When Lavon initially assumed the office of Minister of Defense in 1954, he quickly attempted to assert complete authority within the Ministry. A strong-willed, determined person who had never cultivated personal popularity and who did not hesitate to ride roughshod over the opinions of military and Ministry officials if convinced of his own position, Lavon made few friends and many enemies during his tenure as Minister. This factor was of importance with respect to subsequent developments. (U)

5. (U) Lavon apparently felt that the circumstances surrounding the "security mishap" were sufficiently serious to warrant appointment of a two-man inquiry committee to investigate the entire matter and determine responsibility. The committee consisted of the Chief Justice and a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. It seems clear that Lavon was confident that the committee findings would establish beyond dispute that this ill-fated intelligence operation had been executed without his knowledge and authorization. It also seems clear that Lavon was determined to see that those responsible were dismissed from their positions.

6. (U) However, the committee's findings were not what Lavon had expected. While the findings were completely suppressed, enough is known to indicate that they established that Lavon was aware of this particular intelligence operation. According to sources who have the confidence of Lavon, he had not reckoned with the "resourcefulness and unscrupulousness" of those whom he held to be responsible, and whom he wished to see removed from their positions. These sources state that false testimony and a forged document were presented as testimony to the committee, which the committee accepted as establishing Lavon's participation in the matter. Convinced that this was a plot to force him out of the Ministry, Lavon attempted to fight back. Under the guise of reorganizing the Ministry of Defense, Lavon proposed changes which would have resulted in the loss of position of those he felt were responsible for the affair. (US Embassy, Tel Aviv is informed that while one of Ben-Gurion's proteges, General Moshe Dayan, was retained as Chief of Staff in Lavon's reorganization plan, another protege, the Director General, Shimon Peres, was not). Prime Minister Sharett refused to support Lavon in this plan, whereupon Lavon resigned on 21 February 1955, stating in the Knesset that his resignation was due to differences with Prime Minister Sharett over organizational changes in the Ministry of Defense. He added that he was unable to say more at the time, but that he was certain that the full truth of the matter would be known in due course. (U)

7. (U) Ben-Gurion quickly came out of retirement, and succeeded Lavon as Minister of Defense. Later Ben-Gurion again became Prime Minister, while retaining

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ON MAY 6 1991
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AUTH Para 1-603-DOD-5200.4B

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[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

the Portfolio of Minister of Defense. Lavon retired from public life, but later was elected Secretary General of the Histadrut, and has retained that position. The entire "Lavon affair" appeared to completely disappear from the public scene. Ben-Gurion made no effort to have the matter investigated further. However, the matter had not died as far as Lavon was concerned, and he became increasingly determined to clear his name and bring to justice those whom he believed had "framed" him.

8. (U) Lavon's opportunity came in the Summer of 1960, when one of the Army officers who had given testimony implicating Lavon in the 1955 investigation was arrested and reportedly charged with a criminal offense. Although an attempt was made to completely suppress the results of this trial, it became known that the officer gave sworn testimony which contradicted the testimony he gave in the 1955 investigating committee. (The newspaper breaking this story was fined for evading censorship).

9. (U) Ben-Gurion could now disregard the affair no longer. In his capacity as Minister of Defense, he instructed the Chief of Staff to appoint a new inquiry committee to examine the credibility of the testimony presented to the 1955 committee by two Army officers. The new inquiry committee was headed by Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohn, who was mobilized into the Army reserve for this purpose. Two unidentified "senior officers" completed the membership. The appointment of the committee was made public upon Lavon's return to Israel from Europe on 22 September 1960.

10. (U) Events now moved rapidly. Ben-Gurion and Lavon met on 26 September, and during the discussion, according to Ben-Gurion, he explained to Lavon "the motives that prompted (him) to appoint such a committee". Press speculation reached major proportions, and several members of the Knesset requested the convening of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to discuss the matter. Ben-Gurion and Lavon, apparently not in agreement as to the nature of the issue and how it should be handled, began to conduct a controversy in the daily press. Both Ben-Gurion and Lavon presented testimony to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. On approximately 15 October 1960, the above mentioned Cohn committee submitted its secret report to Ben-Gurion as Minister of National Defense.

11. (U) Thus far there has not been a frank and clear-cut explanation of the basic issues involved. Lavon apparently wanted his name officially cleared of responsibility for the failure of the 1954 intelligence operation, and wanted to place the blame on

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SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

those he considered responsible. Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, initially seemed to be anxious to prevent this matter from developing into a situation which would be political dynamite for his Mapai. Consequently, he at first took the position that Lavon had not been accused of anything and therefore did not need to be rehabilitated. Ben-Gurion wanted to confine the matter to a military investigation, which would mean the results could be suppressed if necessary. Lavon retorted that this type of investigation would not do, and called for the entire question to be reviewed by a political body such as a Knesset committee. The controversy heightened after mid-October 1960, with Ben-Gurion becoming especially vehement. The extremes to which the dispute has been pressed requires some additional explanation which has not yet come to light. There has been some speculation that Lavon is disturbed at the rapidly growing influence of Moshe Dayan and his colleague, Shimon Peres, in Mapai and that he believed that it was "now or never" if he was to prevent a further growth of their influence. Lavon is said to have nurtured a sense of extreme bitterness against Peres and others over the outcome of the 1955 committee findings preceding his resignation. It is noteworthy that Lavon avoided so far as possible public attacks on Ben-Gurion himself. Nevertheless, the attack on Peres in Lavon's testimony before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee may represent an effort to lower the prestige of the people around the Prime Minister and indirectly to strike at Ben-Gurion.

12. (U) In Mapai party conferences discussing the controversy, Ben-Gurion reportedly stated that the appointment of Lavon as Defense Minister, which he had approved, was "the biggest mistake of my life". He reportedly added that Lavon was unqualified for the job. Not unexpectedly, Ben-Gurion strongly support Peres. During the party conference, Peres is said to have called Lavon a liar. Lavon has commented to journalists that Ben-Gurion had been untruthful concerning the affair.

13. (U) The Knesset formed a seven-man Ministerial Committee to examine the "Lavon affair". Ben-Gurion was displeased with this method, stating that he would have much preferred an "objective, legal" investigative body. On 22 December 1960, the press stated that the Ministerial Committee had completed its report. Unattributed press stories stated that the report was adopted unanimously, with the following conclusions:

- a. Lavon did not give direct orders for 1954 security mishap.
- b. No need for further inquiry.
- c. No persons responsible for mishap except an Army officer and a reserve officer. Legal proceeding against them appropriate if police investigation produces sufficient evidence.

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SUBJECT: Current Israeli Political Feud and 1954 Security Case (U)

d. "Unsatisfactory relations" in Ministry of Defense in 1954 may have led to mishap. Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee should consider question of relations between civilian and military within Defense establishment.

Lavon is quoted as saying, "The conclusions of the seven-man committee as published... formed for me the final conclusion of the affair. If seven important men reached this conclusion unanimously, this is full satisfaction for me."

14. (U) The Ministerial Committee's report was formally presented at a Cabinet session on 25 December 1960. Ben-Gurion, according to the press, made the following points concerning the report:

a. He attacked the Ministerial Committee for not reacting to Lavon's "lies" before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and Ben-Gurion reported used terms relating to Lavon's conduct such as "impudence", "forgery", "vileness", and "intrigues".

b. Because of the Israeli Army's education toward political and security responsibility, he stated that it is impossible that an Israeli Army officer would implement security mishap on his own responsibility. While Ben-Gurion does not say Lavon gave orders for the mishap, it has been proved there were discussions, talks, and plans with Lavon's participation, and that Lavon talked to the senior officer about these plans.

c. He stated that Lavon lacks conscience and responsibility, and created demoralization in the Army during his term of office in a manner which could not have occurred under Ben-Gurion six years prior to, and six years after Lavon's term of office. Ben-Gurion will no longer sit together physically or socially with "that man".

d. Commenting on the Ministerial Committee's report, Ben-Gurion asked why it had not called witnesses, such as former Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, and why it had not indicated in its report that two of its members, Shapiro and Rosen, had been members of the Cabinet when the decision was taken in 1955 to dismiss Lavon.

e. For these reasons Ben-Gurion sees no legal or factual basis for the committee's findings.

15. (U) Ben-Gurion, after the Ministerial Committee report, began to talk of resigning, or at least taking a leave from his government duties. On 31 December 1960, the US Embassy, Tel Aviv considered it possible that Ben-Gurion's initial "leave"

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would be followed by his resignation if he does not receive satisfaction concerning the Ministerial Committee findings which favored Lavon. Mapai party meetings are expected to continue in search for a compromise. As of 1 January 1961, the US Embassy, Tel Aviv considered it too early to forecast the final result.

16. (U) In summary, there are still unexplained facets surrounding the furor over this closely guarded Israeli affair. The indicated facts do not fully explain Ben-Gurion's increasingly heated attitude toward Lavon in this controversy. Further, it has not been indicated why Ben-Gurion was so reluctant to re-open the investigation until the above mentioned Army officer's criminal trial in the Summer of 1960 forced his hand. On the basis of available information, it is possible that Ben-Gurion's attitude may be motivated by a desire to shield, by vigorously attacking Lavon, one or more of his own political proteges, including Shimon Peres, who was Lavon's Director General in the Ministry of Defense in 1954-1955, and who is presently Deputy Minister of Defense to Ben-Gurion. Damaging revelations concerning the involvement in the "security mishap" of Peres, or other leading Ben-Gurion adherents, would prove even more serious than the controversy thus far, which has already weakened the Mapai. A further consideration is the possibility of Ben-Gurion's actual involvement himself in the 1954-1955 actions of certain defense officials or intelligence officials who have come to be known as "Ben-Gurion's young men". If this should be the case, however, there is further contradiction in the fact that Ben-Gurion, initially so reluctant to open the matter, now apparently is not willing to close it until he has his way, regardless of the accompanying publicity.

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AGENT REPORT

14019

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CC: NO.	
320054	
DOSSIER NO.	

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Israeli Intelligence
Miscellaneous Information
Vienna, Austria

SECURITY INFORMATION

DATE SUBMITTED

17 March 1953

CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

V-34823

05-002629

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

The following information was received from [redacted] ring an interview on 26 February 1953:

During a conversation with Bronislav Teichholz, the former President of the Rothschild Displaced Persons Camp in Vienna XVIII (American), [redacted] month unknown, Teichholz told [redacted] that a (fmu) Kravetz, a doorman at the Rothschildspital, was an intelligence agent for the Israeli Consulate in Vienna. Allegedly, his mission was to gather information concerning the inhabitants of the Rothschild DP Camp.

(C-3)

During a conversation between [redacted] and Dr. Edmund Kessler, [redacted] Teichholz' successor as President of Rothschildspital, Kessler stated that the Press Officer of the Vienna Israeli Consulate was responsible for Israeli intelligence operations in Vienna. The Vienna Israeli Press Officers during the period 1949-1951 have been: Sishak Rose, followed by (fmu) Alone, then (fmu) Aialone. [redacted] indicated that this post has been vacant since 1952. It was Kessler's contention that Israeli intelligence operations in Vienna have been extremely limited.

(2-6)

[redacted] the Israeli Consul, Mr. (fmu) Bahel, approached [redacted] on one of the latter's regular visits to the Consulate, with a proposal concerning the exchange of information.

[redacted] that his government was interested in information concerning Nazi and Communist activities of Israeli citizens in Austria. Bahel further related that if the US element [redacted] would aid his understaffed consulate to uncover Israeli citizens engaged in Communist activities or East-West trade, he would refuse to extend visas to such persons. Bahel stated that most of the information desired could be obtained from casual visitors to US intelligence installations. [redacted] relayed this proposal to [redacted]

[redacted] who in turn relayed it to [redacted] of Co "C", 53rd MIS Bn. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] forwarded the proposal to G-2, USFA. When [redacted]

(C-2)

The files of this Sub-Detachment revealed that a Mosche Alon is listed as having been the chief of Israeli Secret Service in Vienna in 1951.

(C-3)

The names of the remainder of the persons mentioned in this report failed to appear in the files of this Office.

(B-2)

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(b)(6)

AGENT
S/A CIC

430th CIC, Sub-Det "C" (Vienna)

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SECURITY AGENT REPORT

02002629

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Israeli Intelligence

2. DATE SUBMITTED
2 January 1952

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

V-26839

11464

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

The following information was submitted to this agent during the period 8 November to 10 December 1951 by Informant 1072-T (Evaluation: "B"), and is an account of steps taken by Informant to identify persons engaged in Israeli intelligence operations as per instructions from this agent. (Information: 3)

During the period 8 to 9 November 1951, Informant contacted the following persons with whom Informant has been acquainted for several years, but however, are not acquainted with each other; Otto MAIER, Vienna X, Triesterstrasse, known as the "king" of second-hand goods dealers in Vienna, Dr. Leopold BUSCH, Vienna I, Habsburgergasse 3 and Dr. Leopold BESTERMANN, Vienna VI, Gumpendorferstrasse 10/12, both of whom are lawyers. From all three men Informant learned that Michael ALON, Vice Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Vienna XIX, Peter Jordanstrasse 66 and Simon WIESENTHAL of Linz are probably engaged in Israeli intelligence work. A close personal friendship exists between ALON and WIESENTHAL. WIESENTHAL is known to deal extensively with investigations relative to former Nazis who may still be wanted for war crimes by one of the occupation powers and in the exposing of neo-Nazi organizations which have sprung up since the close of the war. BESTERMANN also stated that WIESENTHAL is attempting privately to trace the alleged gold treasure hidden by the Nazis just prior to the end of the war.

1072-TX/4K
1072-T/4K

EUSC 552 (b)(7)(D)

(b)(7)(D)
EUSC 552 (b)(7)(D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7)

(b)(6)

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3/A, CIC
430th CIC Sub-Det "C" (Vienna)

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(AGENT'S NOTE: Informant has been employed by CIC since December 1950. However, he has sufficient business connections to justify his being in [redacted]. This agent has discussed all facets of this point with Informant, and is of the opinion that Informant's background can survive an extensive investigation and that the possibility of his being exposed as a CIC employee is exceedingly small.)

With the premise that he too has reasons to dislike the NSDAP, Informant offered to collaborate with WIESENTHAL and left himself open to any proposition WIESENTHAL might offer.

WIESENTHAL stated that up until a few months ago he directed an intelligence organization which was more efficient than that of the Americans and of course that of the Austrian police. However, recently, due to the heavy expense involved in running a large organization, he has cut it down to a few efficient operatives and confines his activities to gaining information on the following subjects:

1. Determining the whereabouts of those SS members not yet apprehended who were responsible for persecution of the Jews, especially SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Adolf EICHMANN, former chief of the central office for Jewish emigration. Attached as Exhibit "I" is a list of other personnel in this category which WIESENTHAL provided Informant.

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2. The gathering of information concerning the neo-Nazi movements in Austria from the point of view of possible danger to the Jewish minority in this country.

3. Collecting information on the Soviet and American intelligence organizations, particularly those

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sections which employ former SS and SD personnel. WIESENTHAL stated that recently CIC has dismissed many former SD men; however, the SD influence on CIC is still very strong and constitutes a great danger.

USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

Informant submitted the following background data on WIESENTHAL:

Simon WIESENTHAL

Approximate age: 45

Born in the vicinity of Lemburg, Poland

From a strong Jewish Orthodox family

Attended grammar school and high school in Lemburg, Poland

Attended technical high school in Prague, CSR and is a graduate engineer.

In 1939, after the German occupation of Poland when the Lemburg area was given over to Russia, WIESENTHAL was taken into custody by the Soviets and transported to the Russian interior. After several months in a labor camp he was put to work as an engineer in a pen factory in Odessa. Later he advanced to the position of chief engineer. In some instances he was used as a technical advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Industry. After the German invasion of Russia, WIESENTHAL joined the partisans and was later promoted to the rank of first lieutenant. In 1944, without being recognized as a partisan officer, he was taken prisoner by the German Army and was put in a concentration camp, from which he was freed by the Americans in 1945. He worked almost two years in the document section of the War Crimes Tribunal in Nuernburg, Germany. Today WIESENTHAL is an Israeli citizen. This citizenship was given to him without his ever having been in Israel. (AGENT'S NOTE: Informant states that he has seen WIESENTHAL's Israeli passport.)

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WIESENTHAL has a thorough knowledge of the political and economic situation in Austria. He travels frequently to Switzerland, France, Germany and Italy. He has good connections with a number of Austrian officials and influential officials of the Allied Commission. Close personal ties exist between WIESENTHAL and Dr. (fnu) SILBERSTEIN, the leader of the Jewish Agency in Vienna, and Dr. Heinrich GLEISSNER, Governor of Upper Austria.

WIESENTHAL's views regarding the present situation in Austria are as follows:

The Allies

The two most disagreeable occupation powers in Austria are the Soviets and the Americans. The British never make their presence felt. The situation with the French is more serious, since they have sent mostly former Vichy-people to Austria.

The Soviets

WIESENTHAL becomes quite bitter whenever the Soviets are mentioned. He claims to never go into the Soviet Zone of Austria and seems to have a terrible fear of the NKVD. He is of the opinion that in case of a war in Europe, the Soviets could only hold the Continent for a short time. He knows of a large group of former NSDAP members who are now supporters of the Soviet cause, i.e., Dr. (fnu) SANITZER, Romien GAMOTTA, a former SS officer now employed by the CSR, and Dr. Fritz GRABBE former German consul first class in Bagdad and now a Soviet advisor on the Orient.

The Americans

In WIESENTHAL's opinion, the Americans are children playing at world politics. Fate has given them immense power but the Americans are hardly in a position to use it logically. Just as the Soviets, the Americans are also unpredictable and not to be taken seriously. If one does not take Soviet promises seriously, on the grounds of their tactical expediency, so one cannot take the Americans any too seriously for they are as changeable as weathercocks. In any case, WIESENTHAL, in the

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event he had to decide, would support the Americans against the Soviets. It is a serious matter that the Americans, in their policies in Germany and Austria in connection with the European Army, etc., have been guided to a great extent by biased reports which were played into their hands by German informants. He cited as examples the reports from Dr. W. HOETTL and the Gmunder Circle, who purposely fed false reports to the Americans.

Austria

In regard to the political situation within Austria, WIESENTHAL declared that the country today is influenced by disguised Nazis in leading positions who consciously undermine the stability of the Austrian government from within. For instance, the Austrian police allegedly are under direct pressure from the Nazis, who, by pointing their knowledge, blackmail the anti-Nazi officials and keep them under pressure. Only thus can the fact be explained that Austria does not stamp out the neo-Nazi groups.

The Neo-Nazis

Allegedly, neo-Nazis are split into innumerable small groups and have practically no following, but it is a fact that these groups, especially the former SS leaders are closely united and are waiting for the departure of the Allies. WIESENTHAL believes that when the Allies leave, Austria will be the scene of a massacre as never seen before. These men have vast experience in terrorism and have the financial means to institute such a program. (Here WIESENTHAL refers to the alleged gold treasure of the Nazis.) The leaders of this group will be the former Hitler Youth leader, (fnh) GRIESMAYER, alleged to be hiding in the vicinity of Munich, Germany, who has close contact with Nazi circles in Upper Austria, Salzburg and Tyrol, and a Dr. (fnu) BORA (presumably a cover name), who resides in the vicinity of Innsbruck, who is the leader of the so-called "Pax" movement and is allegedly assembling weapons and explosives and commands the neo-Nazi group in the manner of a superior. BORA is alleged to have very close contact with Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL, (fnu) KERNMAYER, (fnu) KOWARID and other members of the Gmunder Circle. WIESENTHAL claims to be well informed on the activities of HOETTL and his associates. WIESENTHAL lists the following former Nazis as being the leaders of the neo-Nazis movement in Austria today:

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Dr. (fnu) GLATT, alias KAUDERS, a former Gestapo chief residing in St. Gilgen who is covered by the Americans.

(Fnu) LANGOTH, former mayor of Linz.

Dr. (fnu) WESSELY, Linz correspondent for the "Salzburger Nachrichten".

(Fnu) DEVORITZKY, formerly in the Vienna SD office.

Former SS Major Dr. (fnu) HASS, who was deputy to Colonel (fnu) KUPLER in Rome.

Former SS officer (fnu) URBAN now living in Vienna.

Dr. (fn) JEDLICKA now living in Vienna.

Former SS Captain (fnu) MANDL, alleged by WIESENTHAL to be employed by CIC Salzburg.

WIESENTHAL alleges that a close cooperation existing between this group and the Soviets, is evidenced by the fact that HOETTL has been in contact with former SS officer Romien GOMATTA, who is working for CSR intelligence. This connection was established through Russian General (fnu) STERN. According to reports received by WIESENTHAL, GOMATTA frequently comes to Vienna. His Vienna contact man is Dr. Taras BORODAJKEWYCZ, Vienna I, Jakoberg 4, tel. R 22898.

WIESENTHAL stated that former SS Lt. Col. Adolf EICHMANN, who is wanted as a war criminal of the worst type, is being kept hidden by these circles. EICHMANN allegedly was in Gmunden in 1950 but has vanished from there without a trace. EICHMANN's wife, allegedly, is living in Alt-Aussee, Fischerdorf 8 under the name Veronika LIEBL. Contact between EICHMANN and his wife has allegedly been proved by WIESENTHAL who claims to possess an intercepted letter addressed by EICHMANN to his wife, which was supposed to have been delivered through a farm woman from Grundlsee.

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further states that WIESENTHAL had recruited the services of HOETTL, after HOETTL had been let out of his job with CIC Linz. HOETTL provided WIESENTHAL with a 100-page report on the illegal Nazis and all he knew on the VDU.

AGENT REPORT L-23326, dated 31 July 1951, Subject: "GAJEWSKI, Jan", lists WIESENTHAL as an operative of Israeli intelligence interested in collecting information pertaining to the Arab states and as having doubled a CIC Linz employee to obtain information which would not normally be available to him.

AGENT REPORT L-23839, dated 28 November 1951, Subject: "SASSIN, Dr. Richard", indicates that WIESENTHAL may be engaged in the east-west copper trade.

AGENT REPORT L24600, dated 30 November 1951, Subject: "VOLLHARD, Dr. (fnu)", lists WIESENTHAL as the source of information that alleges that SUBJECT is in contact with the RIS.

Letter from Headquarters 66th CIC Detachment European Command, APO 153, US Army to Commanding Officer, 430th CIC Detachment USFA, APO 541, D-292394, dated 27 April 1951, Subject: "Israeli Intelligence Activities", states that Michael ALON, Vice Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Vienna is known as an operative of the Israeli Intelligence Service.

Wilhelm HOETTL is well known to this Office as a former SD officer who has been very active in intelligence work since the war.

(fnu) KERMSAYER is known to be an associate of HOETTL's.

The files of this Sub-Detachment contain many references to Adolf EICHMANN, who is wanted as a major war criminal.

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Letter from Headquarters USFA to Headquarters
430th CIC Detachment, dated 14 December 1945, subject:
"EICHMANN, Adolf", lists EICHMANN's wife as Vera (nee
LIBEL), who is probably identifiable with the Veronika
LIBEL listed in this report as EICHMANN's wife.

Dr. Heinrich GLEISSNER is well known to this
Office as a member of the OeVP and as Governor of Upper
Austria.

The files of this Office contain no identifiable
reference to the Dr. (fnu) BORA mentioned in this report
or to the organization "Pax" that he is alleged to lead.

APPROVED:

ROBERT S. SEAYER
Lt Col Inf
 Commanding

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EXHIBIT "I"

1. Rolf GUENTHER, SS Sturmbannfuehrer, deputy to the central office for Jewish emigrants in Vienna. He received his political education in the Ordensburg of the NSDAP. Went to Berlin in 1940 to join the SD main office. He was a convinced anti-Semite, spoke with northern German accent. Personal description: tall, blond, thin, light eyes, stern features, born approximately 1914, German citizen.
2. Hans GUENTHER, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, chief of personnel of the central office for Jewish emigrants in Vienna. Together with SS Obersturmfuehrer Karl GREVENIG, the administration leader in Vienna, he organized the Jewish camp in Nisko (Poland). Came to Prague in approximately 1939. Personal description: blue eyes, slim, dark blond hair, born approximately 1910.
3. Oskar SENGGER, SS candidate, deputy to administrative leader in Vienna. He assisted in assembling the Jewish transports, which were sent to Poland. The Jews were forced to turn over all cash and jewelry. SENGGER comes from Wolkersdorf, where he was known by the Jewish family DIAMANT. Personal description: blond, unhealthy pale colored skin, light-grey eyes, arched chin, yellowish teeth, thin; born in _____ last residence in Vienna III, Reisnerstrasse. SENGGER was transferred to Theresienstadt in 1942.
4. Franz KUBACEK, SS Unterscharfuehrer, member of the NSDAP, manager of the Jewish registration in Vienna. Personal description: clumsy, solid build, medium height, small scar by mouth, grey-blue eyes, thin, dark blond hair; butcher; married; one child; born _____
5. Richard HARTENBERGER, SS man, worked in room No. 10 at the Gestapo central office for Jewish foreigners. Personal description: medium height, solid build, healthy teeth, dark blond hair, born approximately 1912 to 1914; married; one child; lived in Vienna V. His wife had been teletype operator with the SD.
6. (Fnu) DANEGGER, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, administration manager in the SD main office at Nisko, Poland. Personal

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description: tall, blond, blue eyes, eagle nose,
native of Berlin, born approximately 1915.

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7. Alois BRUNNER, SS candidate, deputy of EICHMANN in Vienna. His wife was employed in room 10 with the Gestapo. Personal description: dark curly hair, blubber lips and large mouth, bony, vivacious. BRUNNER was employed in Fuerstenfeld/Styria in a cheese factory.
8. Anton Rudolf BURGER, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, manager of the adjusting department in Vienna, was imprisoned under DOLLFUSS. His home was in Wiener Neustadt. At the end of 1939 he went to Prague. Personal description: tall, slim, brown eyes, wavy hair, small head, born approximately
- (b)(6)
9. Anton ULLMANN, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, miller's helper. Personal description: tall, dark blond, grey eyes, thin; Austrian; married, two children; born approximately
10. Karl RAHM, SS Oberscharfuehrer. Personal description: blond, solid build, medium height, blue eyes; Austrian; came from Klosterneuburg and resided last at Waehringerpark. RAHM went to Prague in 1940; occupation: machine locksmith; born approximately 1912.
11. Karl DENK, SS Untersturmfuehrer, manager of the SS personnel department in Vienna from 1939 to 1941, was a sailor and went to the Waffen SS in 1941. Personal description: tall, blond, solid, short nose, born approximately 1911-1913.
12. Adolf GIERZIG, SS Oberscharfuehrer, member of NSDAP, was always with BRUNNER. Assisted in assembling the Jewish transports. Personal description: tall, broad, hanging shoulders, broad hips, dark hair, large nose; married, three children; Austrian; born approximately 1912; last residence in Vienna XIII.
13. Karl HROSINEK, SS candidate. Personal description: medium height, slightly corpulent, blond, thin hair, freckles, born approximately

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14. Josef HIRTMAYER, SS Oberscharfuehrer and cashier in the central office of Jewish emigrants, from February 1941-1942. Personal description: medium height, brownish hair, grey eyes, thick eyelashes, receding large chin; comes from Upper Austria; married, one child; bank official and wood dealer; bad gait.
15. (Fnu) KRAUS, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer. Personal description: tall, strong, bald-headed, otherwise blond, born approximately 1910;; Austrian; married, one child; was married to daughter of the bank manager TEPPNER. KRAUS confiscated the "Kaufhaus der Wiener".
16. (Fnu) HAUSERGER, SS Oberscharfuehrer, cashier of the central office in Vienna; comes from Upper Austria; a farmer's son; married; no details.
17. Heinrich BUCHHOLZ, SS candidate, until 1939 manager of the adjusting department in Vienna, then administration officer in Prague; Personal description: small, blond, thin, German citizen.
18. (Fnu) WEISEL, was stationed at the rehabilitation camp for Jews in Windhaag. Personal description: reddish-blond, bony, grey eyes.
19. (Fnu) TROESTL, SS Untersturmfuehrer, was a camp manager in Theresienstadt, was also in Prague. Was supposed to have been shot by the SS, because there were too many dead people among the Jewish transports. Personal description: tall, ape-like teeth, protruding lower jaw, blond; married, three children; born approximately 1915.
20. (Fnu) SLAVIK, SS guard, occupation: butcher. Personal description: tall, corpulent, blond, blue eyes.
- 20a. Alfred SLAVIK, SD, born ; married; wife, Maria nee EAGER. born
21. (Fnu) HAVLICEK, nothing personally known about him; hated BRUNNER, was slender and had pulmonary disease.
22. Karl BREUSTEDT, SS candidate, driver for EICHMANN in Prague during 1940-1941; great ladies' man, three

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illegitimate children. Personal description: small, stout build, blue eyes; married, two children; born approximately 1904-1906; lived at Vienna XIII, Altgasse 3.

23. (Fnu) GUTWASSER, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer and member of the SD, administration officer of the section "Donau". Personal description: small, corpulent, born approximately 1895; German citizen.
24. Hans VOSTREL, SS Scharfuehrer, driver for EICHMANN and BRUNNER, guard troops Nisko, Poland. Personal description: tall, handsome, light blue eyes, dark blond hair, many wrinkles; married; born approximately 1904.
25. Karl BROCKE, SS Standartenfuehrer, controller of the SS and SD. BROCKE lived in Berlin Zaehlendorf am Vierling 25, is supposed to have died in February 1945; born approximately 1888.
26. Konrad GROSSBERGER, SS Obersturmfuehrer, illegal party member, Blutordenstraeger (bearer of the Blutorden), employed in the personnel department in Vienna. Personal description: medium height, strong, blond hair, beginning to bald, light brown eyes, broad mouth, big nostrils, bow-legged; born approximately 1910-1914; residing in Vienna XIII (where streetcar 60 makes the turn).
27. (Fnu) DANZER, SS candidate, in the adjusting department Vienna under RAHM and ULLMANN; came to Prague for several months and is supposed to have been put in jail because of having been involved in some Jewish affairs. Personal description: handsome, brownish hair, medium build; Austrian; born approximately 1919.
28. (Fnu) CHARAUS, SS man, belonged to the SS section "Donau", later was transferred to the SD. CHARAUS has been to the rehabilitation camp Windhag a/Ybbs and is supposed to have been put into the Waffen SS in the year 1940 or 1941.
29. (Fnu) USCHAN, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, sports reporter of the SS section "Donau"; frequently visited the central

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office in Vienna. Personal description: medium build, sporty appearance, brown eyes, brown hair; married, one child; Austrian; born approximately 1914; lived in Vienna XII.

30. Dr. Erich RAJAKOWITSCH, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, lawyer of the central office in Vienna. Son-in-law of Dr. RINTELEN. Was often with EICHMANN. Is supposed to have come to the Waffen SS in 1941. Personal description: medium build, blond hair, grey eyes, a fast talker; married, two children; born approximately 1908-1910; lived at Vienna I, Schottenring 8.
31. Parl MARTIN, SS man, went to Berlin in 1950, has been adjutant of BRUNNER I. Personal description: tall, slim, very handsome, blond, blue eyes; Austrian; born approximately 1916-1918; comes from Klosterneuburg.
32. (Fnu) RUEGER, SS Sturmbannfuehrer, administration officer of the section "Donau". Also represented the administration in the central office in Vienna after the arrest of the SS Hauptsturmfuehrer KREVENICH. Personal description: small, thin flaxen hair, large protruding ears, large mouth, bow-legged; married; German citizen; occupation: master baker; born approximately 1906.
33. Erika UHL, typist and manager of the files under RAHM, ULLMANN and BRUECKLER. Personal description: very pretty, brownish hair, brown eyes, healthy teeth; Austrian; married in 1940 to a medical doctor with a Czech-sounding name, one child; born approximately 1915-1917.
34. Maria SCHNEIDER, typist. Personal description: married, medium build, blond hair; born approximately 1904; lived in Vienna VI, Stumpergasse; is supposed to have been divorced or married later.
35. Gertrude SPATH, typist, member of the NSDAP. Personal description: small, brownish hair, eyebrows grown together, good teeth, an edge is missing on a middle tooth; married; born approximately [redacted]

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36. Gertrude PICHLER, typist, personnel section, secretary of BRUNNER I. Personal description: pretty, slim, red hair, slightly freckled; Austrian; born approximately 1922.
37. (Fnu) MEINL-MEINDL, typist in the Vienna files, was then transferred to the SS section "Donau"; is described as tall and rather corpulent; born approximately 1918; Austrian.
38. Leopoldine BOEGNER nee RUCKENBAUER, member of NSDAP. Husband is former SS Untersturmfuehrer Karl BOEGNER of the SS section "Donau". Personal description: tall, blond, brown slanting eyes, beautiful teeth; lived in Grinzinger Allee; born approximately 1917.
39. Roserl HRUSKA, typist, worked in the adjusting department and was also employed at Castelletzgasse, Sperrlgasse, then SS section "Donau" and SD. Personal description: blond, pretty, blue eyes; born approximately 1923.
40. Gabriele HEJDER, in the adjusting department, engaged to Anton BURGER, coquettish nature, had many affairs with SS leaders. Personal description: slim, very beautiful, ash-blond hair; lived in Vienna, Rechte Wienzeile (near the Tivoli-Kino).
41. Leopoldine MELICHER, typist, adjuting department and files, member of NSDAP, husband was SS member of NSDAP. Personal description: tall, blue eyes, blond hair, thin; Austrian; one child; born approximately 1910-1920; divorced; lived in Vienna II.
42. Ferdinand DAURACH, SS Scharfuehrer, managed the mail files at Prinz Eugenstrasse and later on came to Castelletzgasse. Personal description: tall, slim brownish hair, unclean skin, wears glasses, protruding adam's apple; Austrian; born approximately 1912.
43. Elfriede MUELLER-HAST, Vienna XII, Wittmayergasse 10/7, secretary of BRUNNER II; born approximately 1919-1921; husband was SS Hauptsturmfuehrer.

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END OF EXHIBIT "I"

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
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EXHIBIT "III"



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LEGEND

1. WIESENTHAL's desk
2. Box of keys
3. Safe
4. File cabinet
5. Couch
6. File room
7. File cabinet
8. Door
9. Door
10. Safe
11. Storage cabinet
12. Fireplace
13. Storage cabinet
14. Desk of the typist
15. Radiator
16. Storage cabinet
17. Landstrasse (main street of Linz)
18. Window
19. Corridor (house No. 15, second floor)
20. Staircase

END OF EXHIBIT "II"

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EXHIBIT "III"

Translation

NO-208

SECRET REICHSMATTER!

Office of the leader
of the NSDAP

Berlin, Ws, 29 April 1944
Vossstrasse 4

To the
Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of
the German Police
Heinrich HIMMLER

Berlin SW 11
Prinz Albrechtstrasse 9

Dear Reichsfuehrer :

On order of Reichsleiter Bouhler, I present you
with the enclosed work of Dr. Horst SCHUMANN, about the
influence of X-rays upon human genitals.

Some time ago you asked Oberfuehrer BRACK to carry
out this work and supported it by putting at disposal the
corresponding material at the KZ Auschwitz. I refer especially
to the second part of the work in question, which proves that
a castration of a man is fairly impossible in this way or
demands an expense which does not pay. The operative castra-
tion, which, as I convinced myself, lasts only six to seven
minutes, is therefore more dependable and quicker than the
castration with X-rays.

In the near future I will be able to present you
with the continuation of the work.

Heil Hitler!
Yours very truly
(Signature unreadable)

Enclosure

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Hand written 1940/44 Jeh.Rs.

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End of Translation

~~END OF EXHIBIT "III"~~

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